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MANDATING BOARDSHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT?
Lisa M. Fairfax*
This Article not only argues that corporations must be encouraged to enhance the level of communication between shareholders
and the board, but also maintains that the benefits of increased engagement are significant enough that we should consider developing
standards for incentivizing, if not mandating, more robust boardshareholder engagement for corporations that fail to respond to such
encouragement. In the last several years, shareholders not only have
gained increased authority over corporate elections and governance
matters, but also have demonstrated a willingness to use that authority
to challenge, and even reject, management policies and practices.
Shareholders also have begun to demand increased communication
with the corporation in general, and the board in particular. This Article argues that corporations should be strongly encouraged, if not
compelled, to meet that demand. While acknowledging the potential
pitfalls associated with increased board-shareholder engagement, this
Article further argues that many of those pitfalls have been overstated,
or can be minimized. Moreover, in light of shareholders’ enhanced
influence over corporate affairs, the costs associated with enhanced
engagement may be outweighed by the benefits. While it is not a panacea, increased board-shareholder engagement has the potential to
dramatically increase the corporation’s ability to promote understanding of its policies and programs, and otherwise avoid the negative repercussions of shareholder activism. Thus, this Article endorses proposals that encourage corporations to increase boardshareholder dialogue with two caveats. First, given the menu of
communicative options and the various judgment calls that must be
made when implementing particular options, deference should be given to corporations and the board with respect to which option or options to adopt. Second, the benefits of board-shareholder engagement
are important enough that we should consider proposals that would
more effectively incentivize and even mandate such engagement for
* Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University
Law School. Special thanks for Nicola Sharpe, Cindy Williams, and the participants in the In the
Boardroom symposium for their comments and insights on earlier versions of this draft. All errors, of
course, are mine.
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those corporations that refuse to answer the calls to increase their dialogue with shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
As shareholders have garnered increased influence over corporate
affairs, they also have sought increased interaction with the corporation
in general, and the board in particular. Over the last several years shareholders have advocated for, and obtained, significant influence over director elections, executive compensation issues, and corporate affairs
more generally.1 Shareholders have used this influence to impact board
structure as well as board composition, and even to reject corporate policies.2 Coinciding with their increased influence, shareholders not only
have begun to demand increased engagement with the corporation, but
also have begun to demand more robust engagement with directors.3
This Article argues that corporations should accede to such demands. While some view board-shareholder engagement as crucial to
promoting good corporate governance, there are others who continue to
express concern with its value and desirability.4 Thus, although some
corporations have been willing to increase their levels of boardshareholder engagement,5 studies and anecdotal evidence suggest continued reluctance on the part of many corporate officers and directors,
particularly with respect to increasing the level of interaction between
the board and shareholders.6 To be sure, there exist both legal and practical hurdles associated with shareholder communication, particularly at
the board level. Effective communication involves a considerable time
investment that part-time and overworked directors may be unable to af1. See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 3–4 (2011) [hereinafter SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY].
2. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 53, 61–79 (2008) [hereinafter Making the Corporation Safe] (noting shareholder success in altering
voting standards and annual election of directors); see also infra note 27 (discussing shareholders’ rejection of directors during the last several proxy season).
3. See Dangerous Talk? When/How Should Directors Communicate with Shareholders?,
LATHAM & WATKINS (Latham &Watkins, San Diego, C.A.), at 1–2 [hereinafter Dangerous Talk],
available at http://www.directorsforum.org/resources/pdf/cdf_dangerous_talk_program_outline_3-18.
pdf?ID=3.362 (noting that activist-shareholders who perceive that directors are unwilling to act or believe that management has turned a deaf ear, now increasingly look to directors).
4. See ViewPoints: Advancing Board-Shareholder Engagement, TAPESTRY NETWORKS (Tapestry Networks, Ltd., London, U.K.), at 1 [hereinafter ViewPoints], available at http://www.tapestry
networks.com/issues/corporate-governance/upload/Tapestry-ViewPoints-Advancing-board_share
holder-engagment-30-May-2012.PDF (describing April 2012 discussions between large institutional
investors and directors exploring the topic of board-shareholder engagement).
5. See id. at 2.
6. See id. at 5; see also STEPHEN DAVIS & STEPHEN ALOGNA, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE, TALKING GOVERNANCE: BOARD-SHAREHOLDER
COMMUNICATIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5 (2008), available at http://www.uas.mx/
cegc/consilium/doc/talking-governance-CE0310.pdf (referring to two-way dialogue between boards
and shareholders as rare); Brian V. Breheny, Can We Talk? The Continuing Demand for Shareholder
Engagement, 14 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REP., Apr. 4, 2011, at 1, 3.
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ford. Moreover, directors may not have sufficient knowledge to effectively engage with shareholders. Finally, some forms of engagement may
trigger legal liability.7 This Article, however, insists that these concerns
can be addressed and minimized, if not overcome. More importantly,
any potential disadvantages are far outweighed by the benefits to be
gained from increasing board-shareholder engagement. Indeed, shareholders’ increased power translates into an increased ability to challenge
or reject director-sponsored policies and programs. By enhancing their
engagement with shareholders, directors can better understand shareholder attitudes, gain support for their own policies and practices, learn
vital information about potential shareholder concerns, and ultimately
avoid contentious battles with their shareholders.8 From this perspective,
failing to effectively engage shareholders may be a more costly option
than enhancing board-shareholder engagement.
Thus, this Article concurs with calls to encourage such engagement,
with two caveats. First, while any such engagement must move beyond
the traditional channels of communication, boards should not be compelled to adopt any particular engagement strategy. On the one hand, a
careful assessment of the existing communication platforms reveals that
such platforms may not offer an opportunity for meaningful dialogue between shareholders and directors; instead communication too often falls
along two axes: rote and formulaic, or antagonistic, adversarial, and reactive.9 Hence, any strategy for increasing board-shareholder communication must embrace alternative engagement mechanisms. On the other
hand, this Article does not endorse a particular mechanism. Indeed, this
Article points out that because there are potential benefits and drawbacks to the array of new engagement proposals, and implementing any
proposal involves resolving a host of thorny issues, boards should have
the discretion to determine which proposal or proposals best meet their
communicative needs.10
The second caveat with this Article’s endorsement of proposals for
enhancing board-shareholder engagement is that any such proposals
should include consideration of strategies that would encourage, if not
require, boards to be more proactive in this area. Importantly, boardshareholder engagement is not a cure-all. It does, however, offer corporations the potential to diffuse hot-button issues before they transform
into costly and distracting confrontations.11 Evidence suggests that some

7. For example, inappropriate communications between corporations and shareholders could
result in liability under Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD), which makes it unlawful for corporations and their agents to provide certain kinds of selective disclosure to shareholders. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No.
43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 2.
10. See infra Part III.B.4.
11. See infra notes 99–103.
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corporations may be avoiding board-shareholder engagement based on
misconceptions or long-held, but misguided, aversions to boardshareholder dialogue.12 To the extent such attitudes prevent those corporations from embracing more robust board-shareholder dialogue, this
Article insists that it is appropriate to consider more proactive engagement strategies ranging from incentives to potential mandates.
Part I identifies the ways in which shareholder power has increased
in recent years, and discusses how shareholders and others have argued
that such increased power demands an increase in shareholder engagement, particularly with the board. Against this backdrop, Part II discusses the benefits and drawbacks of shareholder engagement, concluding
that any drawbacks are sharply outweighed by the benefits. In light of
this conclusion, Part III grapples with the best way for ensuring that enhanced board-shareholder engagement occurs. First, Part III demonstrates the need to move beyond the existing communication channels by
illuminating the limitations with their inability to facilitate constructive
dialogue between boards and shareholders. Second, Part III examines
some of the new proposals for enhancing board-shareholder communication, identifies their strengths and weaknesses, and demonstrates why the
decision regarding which proposal to adopt is best left to the board’s discretion. Finally, Part III explains why we should be prepared to consider
strategies for further incentivizing, or even mandating, boardshareholder engagement. It is entirely possible that with the passage of
time, many more corporate boards will step up their efforts to interact
with shareholders.13 If this occurs, further reforms may be unnecessary.
If it does not, however, we should be willing to consider alternative
measures for ensuring appropriate board-shareholder engagement.
I.

SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND CALLS FOR GREATER
SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

By way of background, this Part discusses the manner in which
shareholder power has increased in recent years, and how that increase
has spurred calls for increased shareholder engagement. Corporate governance scandals and the financial crisis not only caused many shareholders to distrust corporate officers and directors, but also prompted
shareholders to seek greater authority over corporate affairs.14 While
there is significant disagreement about the benefits of increased share12. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 6; infra note 83.
13. See Proxy Season 2012: Board Priorities for Shareholder Engagement, PROXY PERSPECTIVES
(Ernst & Young, London, U.K), Feb. 2012, at 1, available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLU
Assets/Proxy_season_2012:_board_priorities_for_shareholder_engagement_(Proxy_perspectives)/$
FILE/Proxy%20season%202012%20board%20priorities.pdf (noting that the 2012 proxy season revealed that more boards are communicating with their shareholders).
14. See Lucien Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 842–43 (2005) [hereinafter Increasing Shareholder Power]; Making the Corporation Safe, supra
note 2, at 55.
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holder influence,15 many shareholders and advocates of increased shareholder power believe it is necessary to serve as a check against managerial malfeasance or board inattention.16 In their view, if shareholders have
greater authority over boards and their decisions, there is a greater likelihood that boards will pay heed to their obligations to more closely and
carefully monitor corporate affairs, while making decisions that are in
the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.17 As a result of
this view, shareholders have waged an aggressive battle to gain more influence over directors and corporate affairs.18 This battle has resulted in
victories on a number of fronts. Section A examines those victories,
while Section B reveals how they have spurred calls for increased engagement at the board level.
A.
1.

Shareholder Activism and the Emergence of
Increased Shareholder Power

Majority Voting

Shareholders have recently achieved significant success in their battle to implement majority voting. Only a few years ago, the vast majority
of public company directors were elected based upon a plurality system
whereby a director was elected so long as that director received a plurality of the votes cast, without counting votes withheld or cast against.19 In
an uncontested election, a plurality voting system means that directors
can be elected so long as they receive any votes cast in their favor, even if
a majority of shareholders vote against a director or otherwise withhold
their votes.20 Amidst concerns that plurality voting could undermine the
impact of shareholder votes, shareholders began advocating for majority
voting.21 Majority voting refers to a system whereby directors must receive a majority of the shareholder vote in order to be elected to the
board.22 In 2005, when shareholders began their majority voting campaign, less than 150 companies had a majority voting system.23 As a result of shareholder activism, by 2010 more than seventy-seven percent of
15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2006) [hereinafter Director Primacy]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 666–67 (2010).
16. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 37–39; Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 14, at 870.
17. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 37–39; Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 14, at 870.
18. See Making the Corporation Safe, supra note 2, at 55.
19. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 10 n.9 (last
updated Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/uploads/documents/majoritystudy111
207.pdf (noting that a “relatively limited” number of corporations had majority voting prior to 2006).
20. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 85.
21. See id. at 88–90.
22. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 472 (2007).
23. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 10 n.9.
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S&P 500 companies adopted some form of majority voting system for
their director elections.24
Majority voting augments shareholders’ ability to impact board
elections and board decision-making. A majority voting regime increases
the likelihood that shareholders will have the ability to unseat incumbent
directors or prevent new directors from holding office.25 Such a regime
also enhances the impact of withhold the vote campaigns. A withhold
the vote or vote no campaign refers to a campaign seeking to encourage
shareholders to withhold their vote or vote against a particular director
or group of directors.26 Shareholders have demonstrated an increased
willingness to wage such campaigns, collaborating to target hundreds of
directors, signaling their displeasure at such directors’ performance or
policies.27 Under a plurality system, however, such campaigns may be
merely symbolic because even when shareholders withhold a majority of
their votes against a director, a director retains her board seat.28 Under a
majority vote system, however, such campaigns could significantly jeopardize a director’s ability to serve on the board. To the extent the threat
of losing a board seat impacts board behavior, majority voting increases
shareholders’ ability to influence board behavior.
2.

Broker Voting

Shareholder activism also has prompted changes to the broker voting rules. A considerable number of public company investors purchase
their shares through a broker who then holds the shares in an account for

24. Noam Noked, 2011 Annual Corporate Governance Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Jan. 12, 2012, 9:28 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2012/01/12/2011-annual-corporate-governance-review/. As of June 2008, more than sixty percent of Fortune 500 companies had some form of majority voting. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY,
supra note 1, at 90.
25. Under most majority voting systems a director does not automatically lose her seat as a result of a failure to receive a majority of the shareholder vote. Instead, the director either must tender
her resignation which the board must then decide whether to accept, or the director remains in office
for some time period until the board selects a new director. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra
note 1, at 90–91. Hence, shareholders do not have absolute control over the election outcome. Nevertheless, a majority voting regime increases shareholders’ ability to directly and indirectly impact board
elections. See id.
26. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 908 (1993).
27. See TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S.
POSTSEASON REPORT 3–4 (2011). During 2009 and 2010, eighty-nine and eighty-seven directors, respectively, did not earn majority support. Id. at 14. During 2011, only forty-three directors received
less than majority support. Id. The ISS report attributed this decline to the implementation of say on
pay and its impact on shareholder voting. See id. Importantly, however, the past few proxy seasons
have also revealed that even when directors receive majority support, there are many directors who
receive a high level of shareholder dissent.
28. There are some governance experts who believe that withhold the vote campaigns impact
director elections even without majority voting. See Grundfest, supra note 26, at 908. Moreover, at
least one study confirms this belief. See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 85–86 (2008).
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shareholders’ benefit.29 Under federal and securities exchange act rules,
brokers can cast votes for shares held in their accounts (1) if they do not
receive shareholder voting instructions within ten days of the shareholder meeting, and (2) if the vote relates to a matter deemed routine.30 Because uncontested elections were deemed routine, brokers were able to
cast uninstructed votes in such elections. Empirical evidence revealed
that broker discretionary voting could account for as much as twenty
percent of the total vote in such elections.31 Moreover, studies indicate
that broker discretionary voting overwhelmingly follows management.32
Hence, shareholders contended that such voting distorted election outcomes and undermined shareholder influence.33 As a result, shareholders
began advocating for the prohibition of uninstructed broker voting in uncontested elections.34 In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) abolished discretionary voting in uncontested elections,35 and in
2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(the Dodd-Frank Act) codified that abolition into law and extended it to
prohibit such voting in connection with certain other compensation matters.36 Studies reveal that in some elections, if broker discretionary voting had not been allowed, the election result would have been more consistent with shareholder preferences.37 Thus, like majority voting, the
ban on broker discretionary voting could have a considerable impact on
shareholders’ ability to influence director elections and corporate affairs.38
3.

Classified Boards

Shareholder activism surrounding classified boards has led to
changes that could impact shareholders’ ability to influence director elections and corporate affairs. If a corporation has a staggered or classified
29. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 23–24.
30. See id. at 24.
31. CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY STATUS
QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 5 (2011), available at http://
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072011.pdf.
32. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 560–61
(1990).
33. See LARRY W. SONSINI ET AL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING
GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 14 (June 5, 2006) [hereinafter PROXY WORKING
GROUP REPORT], available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf.
34. Id. at 7–8.
35. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 74 Fed. Reg.
33,293 (July 1, 2009).
36. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1906 (2010).
37. See PROXY WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 33, at 9.
38. However, at least one study questions the impact of the recently changed broker voting rules.
Although it only studied a limited time-frame, the study indicated that the new rules did not appear to
have any impact on director approval ratings. See Ali Akyol et al., The Elimination of Broker Voting:
Much Ado About Nothing?, 2–3 (Dec. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1973558.
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board, shareholders only elect a portion of the board each year.39 Shareholders have sought board declassification for decades, but only recently
have their efforts proved successful.40 A 2010 study indicated that seventy-two percent of boards elect directors annually, up from forty percent a
decade ago.41 Declassifying a board enables shareholders to replace the
entire board in one election cycle, enhancing their power over board
elections.
4.

Proxy Access

New proxy access rules also have the potential to enhance shareholders’ influence. Proxy access refers to the ability to include shareholder nominated candidates on the corporation’s proxy statement.42 In
August 2010, after considerable debate and pressure from the investment
community, the SEC passed proxy access rules for the first time in its history.43 These rules granted shareholders two routes for obtaining proxy
access. First, subject to certain conditions, the SEC mandated proxy access by requiring every public company to grant shareholders who held
at least three percent of a company’s voting securities for at least three
years the right to nominate a candidate of their choice onto the corporation’s proxy statement.44 Second, the SEC allowed shareholders to propose bylaw amendments related to specific procedures for proxy access.45
Such bylaws enabled shareholders to create their own proxy access requirements so long as they were not more restrictive than the rules related to mandated proxy access.46 In July 2011, however, the D.C. Circuit
overturned the provision in the rules mandating proxy access.47 The D.C.
Circuit left untouched the portion of the rules enabling shareholders to
propose bylaw amendments requesting corporations to implement specific procedures for proxy access.48 The most recent proxy data indicates
that shareholders have taken advantage of their ability to submit proxy
39. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 80–81.
40. Compare Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 14, at 854 (showing evidence of shareholder support for board declassification, coupled with evidence of company’s refusal to change board
structure), with SPENCER STUART, 2010 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 14 (25th ed. 2010), available
at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2010.pdf (showing dramatic increase in declassified boards).
41. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 40, at 4, 14. Another study reveals only twenty-nine percent of companies in the S&P 500 have classified boards, as compared to sixty percent in 2000. See
John J. Madden, The Shifting Landscape of Corporate Governance, and Four Steps Boards Should
Take in an Era of Shareholder Ascendancy, 14 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REP., Feb. 7, 2011, at 2 (citing shark repellent study).
42. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 129.
43. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange
Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16,
2010).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
48. Id. at 1153.
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access proposals, with some success.49 Thus, several shareholders have
submitted proxy access proposals, and a few corporations have agreed to
support proxy access at their companies.50
While there is significant debate regarding the potential impact and
propriety of a proxy access rule,51 shareholders contend that proxy access
is vital to their ability to influence election outcomes and corporate practices.52 Prior to the SEC’s proxy access rules, federal law prohibited
shareholders from nominating candidates of their choice onto the corporation’s proxy statement.53 Instead, only management-supported candidates appeared on the proxy statement.54 If shareholders wanted to elect
a different set of candidates they had to wage a proxy contest by creating
and distributing a separate proxy statement to shareholders.55 Evidence
suggests that the expense associated with such an endeavor proved prohibitive for all but a few shareholders.56 As a result, most directors ran
unopposed, undermining shareholders’ ability to impact board candidate
decisions.57 Shareholders view proxy access as a cost-effective way for
them to have a greater voice in the board nomination and election process.58
5.

Say on Pay

Shareholders also have experienced success in their efforts to play a
greater role in compensation decisions. In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress mandated say on pay—a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation.59 The mandate requires that every public corporation
give its shareholders a say on pay vote, and that such corporations give

49. See Considerations for Public Company Directors in the 2012 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN,
(Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 3, 2012 (noting that at least fifteen companies
have received proxy access proposals as June 2012).
50. See id.; see also Adam Piore, US Proxy Season’s Mid-Year Trends, INSIDE INVESTOR
RELATIONS (July 24, 2012), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/proxy-voting-annualmeetings/18867/us-proxy-seasons-mid-year-trends/ (noting that Hewlett-Packard agreed to implement
proxy access in 2013 for shareholders who own at least five percent of the company’s shares; and that
at least two dozen companies had received proxy access proposals).
51. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 129–33.
52. Id. at 129–30.
53. See Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2007); see also SHAREHOLDER
DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 128.
54. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 128.
55. See id. Shareholders could also recommend a director candidate to the board’s nominating
committee or attend the annual meeting to nominate a candidate, but neither alternative is likely to
result in enabling shareholders to nominate a candidate of their choice to the board.
56. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29, 384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668
(Sept. 16, 2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 681–
91(2007) [hereinafter Shareholder Franchise].
57. See Shareholder Franchise, supra note 56, at 688–89.
58. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,668.
59. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 951(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010).
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shareholders a “say on frequency”—the ability to determine whether
such a vote would occur annually, every other year, or once every three
years.60 Anecdotal and empirical evidence reveal that say on pay enhances shareholders’ ability to influence corporate pay practices in at
least two respects. First, such votes appear to lead to increased interaction between shareholders and directors thereby increasing shareholders’
ability to influence decisions regarding the executive pay.61 Second, the
votes increase the extent to which executive pay is aligned with performance in a manner approved by shareholders.62
6.

Shareholder Activism and Shareholder Influence

Through each of these reforms, shareholders garnered increased influence over director elections in particular, and corporate affairs more
generally. Importantly, shareholder influence not only directly impacts
board membership, but also directly impacts policies over which directors have primary, if not sole, responsibility. As Section B will explain,
shareholders’ increased power related to these and other matters has repercussions for the importance of emphasizing board-shareholder engagement.
B.

Connecting Shareholder Activism with Shareholder Engagement

Historically, shareholder engagement has not been a top priority of
directors and officers. Studies reveal that twenty-five years ago, the topic
of shareholder communication had not yet surfaced.63 Shareholders were
relatively passive, with neither the resources nor the inclination to seek
to actively impact corporate governance.64 Moreover, shareholders did
not have many mechanisms at their disposal to influence corporate affairs.65 As a result, few shareholders demanded interaction with corporations or the board.66 Similarly, the board felt no significant compulsion to
engage shareholders outside of their fairly routine presence at the annual
meeting.67

60. Id. § 951(a)(1)–(2).
61. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case
for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 337–40 (2009); Stephen Davis, Does ‘Say on Pay’
Work?: Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable 16 (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance, Yale School of Management); Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from
the UK (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1420394 (citing say on pay regulations in the U.K.).
62. See Davis, supra note 61, at 15.
63. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 40, at 3.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 4.
67. See id. at 3.
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Increased shareholder activism, however, has led them to demand
greater engagement, particularly with the board.68 A recent survey revealed that a significant number of investors sought greater engagement
with the board.69 Shareholders and their advocates have proposed a
range of different strategies for increasing their interactions with board
members from annual corporate governance calls with directors, to periodic “investor days” at the corporation spearheaded by directors.70
The SEC has indicated its support for increased communication between the board and its shareholders. The SEC recently dedicated a section of a concept release to issuer communication with shareholders, noting that many commentators have stressed the increased need for
corporations to be able to communicate with their shareholders.71 The
SEC sought guidance on ways to enhance the ability of corporations to
effectively and efficiently communicate with shareholders,72 making clear
that increased engagement should begin with board-shareholder communication.73 Thus, in 2010, the SEC called for corporations to make
board-shareholder engagement a priority.74 SEC Chair Mary Schapiro
implored directors to have “clear conversations with investors about how
the company is governed.”75
Along these same lines, several corporate governance experts and
organizations have advocated making effective board-shareholder engagement a priority. To be sure, calls to prioritize shareholder engagement are not new. As early as 1992, Martin Lipton proposed that boards
implement a process to meet annually with their largest shareholders.76
Such a proposal was central to an overall proposal to strengthen board
accountability and thereby enhance corporate governance.77 Calls to prioritize board-shareholder engagement, however, have increased within
the last few years. In 2003, the National Association of Corporate Direc-

68. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 48.
69. See Aarti Maharaj, Governance During ‘Shareholder Spring,’ CORP. SEC’Y (May 31, 2012),
http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/corporate-secretary-week/12246/governance-during-share
holder-spring/ (noting that ninety-two percent of shareholders have called for more engagement with
the board); FTI CONSULTING, SHAREHOLDER VOICE GROWING LOUDER IN THE BOARDROOM:
RESULTS OF FTI CONSULTING’S SECOND ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INVESTOR SURVEY 3
(2012), available at http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20120412_FTI-survey.pdf (finding that ninety-four percent of shareholders are calling for more engagement with the chairman of the
board).
70. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 8–9.
71. See Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 42,998–99 (proposal
July 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 270, 274, 275).
72. See id. at 42,998.
73. See id. at 43,000.
74. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the NACD Annual Corporate Governance Conference (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch101910
mls.htm.
75. See id.
76. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 74 (1992).
77. Id. at 61.
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tors (NACD) established a task force on improving board-shareholder
communications.78 By 2008, a small group of corporations, corporate
governance experts, and business organizations such as the Business
Roundtable signed a set of guidelines, known as the Aspen Principles,
urging greater board shareholder communication.79 In 2009, the Committee on Capital Markets recommended that boards consult with shareholders on a range of governance matters.80 That same year, an American Bar Association (ABA) task force recommended that boards
“[e]mbrace their role as the body elected by the shareholders to manage
and direct the corporation by . . . affirmatively engaging with shareholders to seek their views.”81 These efforts underscore a growing recognition
that the new era of shareholder power requires more interaction between
directors and shareholders.
II. THE VALUE OF ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATION IN
AN ERA OF ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER POWER
While there is a growing recognition of the importance of boardshareholder communication, there is no clear consensus on its benefits.82
Instead, some express skepticism regarding its value,83 while surveys reveal continued reluctance on the part of corporate directors and officers
to increase engagement with shareholders, particularly at the board level.84 To be sure, increased engagement is not a panacea, nor does it guarantee positive outcomes. This Part insists that the costs associated with
such engagement may have been over-emphasized, however, while the
benefits may have been under-appreciated.
A.

The Benefits of Engagement

Shareholders’ increased voice in corporate affairs makes shareholder engagement a priority for several reasons. First, it is increasingly important for the corporation to better understand shareholder concerns so
that they can either better incorporate such concerns into their policies

78. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS & NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRS.,
FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS FOR IMPROVING BOARD-SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS (2004) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS], available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/nacd030904attach.pdf.
79. See ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/
content/docs/business%20and%20society%20program/FINALPRINCIPLES.pdf.
80. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 9.
81. See Holly Gregory, Excerpts from Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Business
Law Corporate Governance Committee on Delineation of Governance Roles & Responsibilities, in
SEVENTH ANNUAL DIRECTOR’S INSTITUTION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 107, 120 (2009).
82. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2–3; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 6 (noting some directors’ aversion to enhanced engagement); see also Breheny, supra note 6, at 3.
83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
84. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 3.
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and practices or otherwise be better equipped to respond to those concerns.85 For example, evidence reveals that some corporations have
reached out to shareholders to determine their views regarding compensation issues and ensure that their pay practices incorporate such views.86
In this respect, shareholder engagement enables corporations and the
board to fashion policies and practices that better reflect shareholder interests.
Second, enhanced shareholder engagement gives corporations the
ability to educate their shareholder base.87 Such engagement provides
corporations with the opportunity to explain their perspective and policies in a manner that could prevent misunderstandings.88 It also enables
the board to provide information to shareholders so that they can make
more informed decisions.89 Given that shareholders now have a voice
over a range of corporate governance decisions,90 this educational role is
vital.
Third, shareholder engagement enables corporations to generate
support for their policies, as well as support for the directors and officers
who shape and approve those policies.91 In an era where shareholders
have an increased ability to reject corporate pay packages92 and unseat
directors,93 ensuring such support is clearly vital. Indeed, recent proxy
data reveals that one crucial difference between companies that have
won shareholder support for their policies and those that have failed, is
companies’ willingness to engage directly with shareholders.94 As a
Wachtell Lipton memo recently noted, “no technique is more effective in
winning the vote than direct shareholder outreach.”95
Fourth, engaging with shareholders could generate goodwill among
the shareholder base that creates allies that may help repel takeovers or
efforts from those seeking to threaten or undermine corporate policies.
85.
86.
87.

See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 115–16, 122.
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 2.
See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 124; IRA M. MILLSTEIN ET AL., WEIL
GOTSHAL, TEN THOUGHTS FOR ORDERING GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIPS IN 2010, at 2 (Jan. 2010)
[hereinafter TEN THOUGHTS], available at http://tinyurl.com/Weil10Thoughts; see also REINHART
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SERVS. E-ALERT, ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS UNDER DODDFRANK: TOOLS FOR ENSURING THAT PROXY VOTES ARE INFORMED AND INDEPENDENT 2 (MAR. 27,
2011) [hereinafter ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS], available at http://www.reinhartlaw.com/
Publications/Documents/ea_20110527%20RIIS.pdf.
88. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 115.
89. See id. at 123; see also ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, supra note 87, at 2; TEN
THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2.
90. See supra Part I.A (noting shareholders’ increased voice in board elections and executive
pay).
91. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2.
92. See supra Part I.A (noting impact of say on pay).
93. See supra Part I.A (noting shareholders’ ability to impact board elections because of majority voting, broker voting, proxy access, and classified board exchanges).
94. See Jeremy L. Goldstein et al., Say on Pay 2012, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 14, 2012, 10:28 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/
07/14/say-on-pay-2012/#more-30571.
95. See id.
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Indeed, if shareholder engagement increases the likelihood that shareholders will view management and their policies favorably, it also reduces the ability of other shareholders and even proxy advisory firms to influence the actions of their existing shareholder base. In other words,
effective shareholder engagement can translate into shareholder support
in times of turmoil.
Fifth, shareholder engagement enables corporations and the board
to have a better appreciation for future issues, and therefore be better
prepared to tackle potential problems that may arise with such issues.96
Ultimately, shareholder engagement may enable corporations to
avoid costly confrontations with shareholders. Some governance experts
suggest that much of shareholder activism could be avoided with effective shareholder engagement.97 This is because shareholder activism often reflects an effort to gain the attention of directors deemed to have ignored their concerns.98 Consistent with this perspective, one proxy
advisory firm representative emphasized that such firms do not target
companies that engage in constructive dialogue with their shareholders.99
Proxy advisory firm representatives also have indicated that even when
boards do not implement particular processes, the fact that they have engaged in open dialogue with shareholders reduces the likelihood of
shareholder actions against them.100 Hence, increased shareholder engagement seems to be an obvious and even critical response to increased
shareholder power.101
B.
1.

Assessing and Debunking the Costs of Engagement

Regulation FD

Existing research suggests that many corporate officers and directors view Regulation Fair Disclosure, known as Regulation FD, as a significant obstacle to more robust shareholder communication.102 Adopted
in 2000, Regulation FD was designed to promote full and fair disclosure
of important issues, and thus prohibit corporations from selectively dis-

96. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 1 (encouraging board-shareholder communication
because of its ability to “get out ahead” of issues).
97. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2 (noting one experts belief that “almost every hot button governance issue can be addressed through constructive communication between boards and management with shareholders”).
98. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 6.
99. See Action Plan to Engage Shareholders, Improve Board Composition, NACD
DIRECTORSHIP (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.directorship.com/action-plan-to-engage-shareholdersimprove-board-composition/.
100. See id.
101. See Madden, supra note 41, at 4–5 (noting that to proactively respond to the shifting governance landscape, corporations must constructively engage with shareholders).
102. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 5; FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS, supra note 78, at 9.
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closing information in a manner that could result in insider trading.103
Regulation FD requires that when a public company or someone acting
on its behalf discloses material nonpublic information to market professionals or its shareholders who may trade on the information, the company must publicly disclose such information.104 Corporations therefore
must be mindful of Regulation FD in all of their communications with
shareholders, particularly communications with selective shareholders or
communications during meetings that are not open to the public. Studies
indicate that concern over potential violations of Regulation FD undermines corporations’ willingness to enhance their engagement with shareholders.105
In 2010 the SEC issued interpretive guidance on Regulation FD
aimed at allaying such concerns.106 The SEC emphasized that Regulation
FD does not prohibit corporate directors and officers from engaging in
private meetings with shareholders. In order to ensure that corporations
do not convey material nonpublic information during such meetings, the
SEC recommended that corporations implement procedures governing
private meetings with shareholders such as pre-clearing discussion topics
with counsel, or having counsel participate in the meetings.107 The SEC
further pointed out that corporations can discuss material nonpublic information with shareholders so long as such shareholders expressly agree
to keep the information confidential.108 Finally, even if corporations inadvertently disclose material nonpublic information, they can avoid violating Regulation FD by promptly disclosing the information to the public.109 In its adopting release, the SEC noted that technological advances
had made it much easier to broadly disseminate information, and thus
corporations have a variety of different ways in which they can comply
with their disclosure obligations under Regulation FD.110 The SEC’s interpretative guidance confirmed that corporations could satisfy these obligations by posting information on the corporation’s website.111 In sum,
the SEC has tried to make clear that with appropriate planning Regulation FD should not deter corporate dialogue with shareholders.

103. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000).
104. See id. at 51,719.
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
106. See Regulation FD, SEC (last updated June 4, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
guidance/regfd-interp.htm.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000).
111. See Regulation FD, supra note 106.
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Experts also have suggested that corporate concerns related to
Regulation FD may be overstated.112 Indeed, the SEC has identified seven categories of information or events that have an increased potential to
be deemed material, and corporate governance matters are not so identified.113 Thus, experts contend that there is a reduced likelihood that the
information about which shareholders are most concerned will run afoul
of Regulation FD.114 Only the SEC can bring an action under Regulation
FD, there is no private right of enforcement.115 Studies reveal less than
ten Regulation FD enforcement actions, and no enforcement action or
investigation related to companies that have had or are planning to have
private meetings with shareholders.116 Thus, the SEC—through guidance
and its enforcement practice—appears to have made clear its intent not
to use Regulation FD to chill shareholder communication with boards,
potentially reducing concerns about the impact of Regulation FD.
Moreover, companies seeking to engage with shareholders have
adopted many of the procedures recommended by the SEC, which in
turn has enabled them to avoid potential legal liability while having constructive conversations with their shareholders.117 These procedures include: (a) developing an agenda limited to publicly available information,118 (b) ensuring that legal counsel is present at any shareholder
meeting,119 (c) pre-approving topics for the meeting,120 (d) providing a
publicly-available record or transcript of the meeting,121 and (e) encouraging shareholders to sign nondisclosure agreements.122
Thus, both corporate experience and regulator inaction suggest that
while corporations must be mindful of Regulation FD, it should not serve
as a major impediment to communication with shareholders. Governance experts note that corporations have over-emphasized the obstacle
presented by Regulation FD, with some even suggesting that boards may
be using Regulation FD as a “crutch” to avoid speaking with shareholders.123

112. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 5; see also MARC GOLDSTEIN, THE STATE OF ENGAGEMENT
BETWEEN U.S. CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS: A STUDY CONDUCTED BY INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES FOR THE INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER INSTITUTE 20
(2011), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/IRRC-ISS_EngagementStudy.pdf.
113. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
114. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 10.
115. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
116. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 10.
117. See id.
118. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 126; ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS,
supra note 87, at 4.
119. See sources cited supra note 118.
120. See sources cited supra note 118.
121. See sources cited supra note 118.
122. See sources cited supra note 118.
123. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 20 (noting one asset manager’s assertion that Regulation
FD concerns were “more of an excuse cited by issuers than an actual obstacle”); ViewPoints, supra
note 4, at 5.
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Grandstanding?

Some directors may be concerned that shareholder activists will use
any additional board-shareholder meetings simply as a means of being
disruptive or grandstanding, and thus may not truly have an interest in
meaningful communication.124 To be sure, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence suggesting that often the few people who attend annual meetings
do so in order to be disruptive.125 These anecdotes support the notion
that shareholder meetings have become, in one expert’s words, a
“[t]heater of the [a]bsurd.”126 Such anecdotes also may undermine directors’ desire to engage in shareholder dialogue beyond the status quo.
Such evidence should not be used to condone all forms of boardshareholder meetings, however. First, it is clear that some shareholder
groups are serious about effective communication, and legitimately desire to dialogue with the board.127 Second, shareholder behavior at the
annual meeting is not a useful proxy for determining how shareholders
will conduct themselves in other settings. This is because, as will be discussed in Part III, the annual meeting is not a useful platform for engagement. Most issues are settled prior to the meeting.128 This may
make it more likely that shareholders who attend the meeting will engage in symbolic, if not confrontational, tactics. Hence, such behavior
124. See Christina Rexrode, The Loudest Shareholder Activist Ready for a Break, USA TODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/media/story/2012-07-13/evelyn-y-davis-gadfly-retires/56203956
/1 (last updated July 13, 2012, 5:03 PM) (noting concern that activist shareholders make a “mockery of
shareholder advocacy” by “grandstanding for attention” rather than “talking about the issues”); see
also James Kristie, The Fix is In, DIRS. & BDS., First Quarter 2011, at 6, available at http://
www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/2011Q1_Directors%20&%20Boards-articles.pdf (noting
that annual meetings are often hijacked by the “shout and yell of gadflies”); David Shaw, The Directors and Boards Survey: The Effectiveness of Annual Meetings, DIRS. & BDS., First Quarter 2011, at 36,
available at http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/2011Q1_Directors%20&%20Boardsarticles.pdf (noting the perceived “hijacking of meetings”).
125. See Josh Harkinson, Wells Fargo Turns Away Its Own Shareholders From Its Shareholder
Meeting, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/04/wellsfargo-turns-away-its-own-shareholders-annual-meeting (discussing strategy of targeting shareholder
meetings, and actions by some 2000 shareholders of blocking entrances and inflating a smoking rate in
front of the site of the annual meeting); Rexrode, supra note 124 (discussing shareholder who purchases stock in various companies for the primary reason of attending annual meetings and heckling
CEOs, shouting at other shareholders, and bringing “entertainment value” to the meetings); Ann
Saphir & Tom Polansek, Annual Meeting Disrupted by Activist Shareholders, CHI. TRIB. (May 23,
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-23/news/sns-rt-cmeannual-meeting--update-1l1e8gnh
u4-20120523_1_cme-group-cme-s-executive-chairman-exchange-operator (noting annual meeting disruption resulting from shareholders shouting and clapping at meeting headquarters); see also Suzanne
McGee, ‘Shareholder Spring?’ Protesters Roil Annual Meetings, FISCAL TIMES, May 10, 2012, available
at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2012/05/10/Shareholder-Spring-Protesters-Roil-AnnualMeetings.aspx#page1 (describing shareholder antics at various companies).
126. Carl T. Hagberg, What to do About the Annual Meeting?, DIRS. & BDS., First Quarter 2011,
at 25, 27.
127. See Shaw, supra note 124, at 38 (noting that shareholders raised pay questions at the annual
meeting); Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 1 (noting shareholders’ increased desire to discuss governance issues); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 5, 16 (pinpointing shareholder engagement over various
governance topics).
128. See Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26.
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should not be used to negate the utility of board-shareholder communication; instead, it tends to support the assertion that such communication
must occur outside of the boundaries of the annual meeting to be effective.
3.

No Good Deed . . .

Some may object to increased shareholder engagement based on
the potential for such engagement to go awry. Importantly, studies suggest that boards and shareholders have differing perspectives regarding
what constitutes effective engagement as well as what constitutes a successful engagement.129 These differing perspectives create the potential
that shareholder engagement could produce negative results.130 Indeed,
ineffective engagement could increase shareholder frustration and discontent with corporate officers and directors.131 This is particularly true if
shareholders have no desire for true engagement, but instead want to use
interactions with directors to advance their own personal agenda, or otherwise act as a corporate gadfly.
This possibility should not prevent corporations from seeking to further their engagement efforts, however. Rather, it underscores the need
for careful planning and preparation. Fortunately, not only have corporations begun to identify best practices for such planning and preparation, but there are many examples of companies that have experienced
success when employing those practices.132 Because the potential for
negative outcomes can be minimized, corporations should not rely on
that potential to prevent them from taking advantage of the clear benefits of increased board-shareholder engagement.
4.

Board Specific Objections

Importantly, even those who acknowledge the need for increased
engagement with shareholders raise several objections to engagement at
the board level.
a. Resource Constraints
As an initial matter, one may object to board-shareholder communication based on the notion that directors may not have the time and resources to devote to effective shareholder engagement. Successful and
129. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 3; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 5; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 112, at 3, 22–26.
130. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 22. The report notes that issuers are “happy to talk, but
investors want to see concrete action.” Id. Such a divergent view of success may mean that investors
become frustrated when dialogue does not move beyond simply talking while boards may view the
dialogue as successful in itself and thus may not necessarily see a need to take specific actions.
131. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 116.
132. See id. at 125–26; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 28; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 7–8.
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effective engagement can take a considerable amount of time. Studies
reveal that such engagement can last anywhere from a week to more
than a month.133 Timing concerns are particularly acute at the board level. A recent study of engagement found that all respondents reported resource and time considerations as the most significant impediment to engagement.134 Indeed, recent reforms impose additional responsibilities on
directors that require them to devote considerably more time to their director duties.135 Given that the vast majority of directors are not employed by the companies on whose board they serve, and thus only serve
on the board in a part-time capacity,136 it may be both impractical and inappropriate to impose even more responsibilities on directors, and expect that they can effectively carry out those responsibilities.
The observation regarding time constraints is valid, and any reform
should appropriately consider whether directors have the capacity for effective performance. It is entirely possible, however, that effective
board-shareholder engagement could enable directors to conserve valuable time and resources, or otherwise ensure that directors are not compelled to expend additional resources unnecessarily. Indeed, anecdotal
evidence suggests that directors’ failure to effectively communicate with
shareholders could cause shareholders to reject corporate policies,
prompting directors to devote added resources toward those policies to
regain the support of shareholders.137 This suggests, in turn, that proactive engagement can save valuable time and resources.
b. The Need for Consistency
Some may object to board-shareholder communication based on the
corporations’ need to speak with one voice. In essence, objectors might
argue that it is important for the corporation to have a unified voice to
demonstrate a shared commitment to corporate goals as well as stability
within the corporation.138 That voice, because of informational advantages, has historically been management and not the board.139 In fact,
it is possible that when boards speak directly with shareholders, boards
may create distance between directors and managers or otherwise cause
dissension that may frustrate the board’s ability to work productively
133. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 4.
134. See id. at 20.
135. See SPENCER STUART, 2011 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 26–27 (26th ed. 2011), available
at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/1:6/SSBI_2011_final.pdf (noting increase in board
meetings and time commitment associated with board duties in 2011, post Dodd-Frank and other financial reforms).
136. Id. at 14.
137. See Piore, supra note 50.
138. See Lissa Perlman, The Best Way to Lead: One Voice and a Consistent Message, DIRS. &
BDS., Second Quarter 2010, at 25, 25.
139. See James Kristie, Who Speaks for the Board?, DIRS. & BDS., Second Quarter 2010, at 18
(noting that the longstanding tradition of the corporation has been that the corporation speaks with
one voice—management).
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with management.140 Moreover, increased communication between directors and shareholders could lead to inconsistent and conflicting messages regarding the corporation’s goals and practices.141
The increasing trend towards focusing on board independence, coupled with the trend toward emphasizing board responsibility to oversee
management, means that interaction with management can no longer be
deemed to be a proxy for interaction with the board.142 Instead, shareholders increasingly have been encouraged to view directors as an independent voice and as a check on managerial behavior and policies.143 Reforms ranging from mandates of director independence on board
committees to calls for separation of the position of board chair and the
CEO both embody and solidify the belief that directors are supposed to
act independently from managers.144 This changed understanding of the
directors’ role increases shareholders’ desire to communicate directly
with directors because it encourages shareholders to view them as a separate and distinct voice.145
c.

Informational Disadvantage

Some also may suggest that shareholder engagement with the board
is not necessary because boards have an informational disadvantage visá-vis other corporate actors. That is, boards do not have sufficient understanding of corporate affairs to handle such engagement.146 Instead,
corporations may be deemed to have many other actors who are better
equipped to interact with shareholders.147 First, most large public corporations devote significant resources to their investor relations department148 that presumably has the expertise necessary to field investor queries.
Hence, one may contend that the bulk of shareholder
communication should fall on their shoulders. Second, corporate secretaries also have increasingly played a role in interacting with shareholders and keeping abreast of their concerns.149 Studies reveal that such sec140. See Perlman, supra note 138, at 25.
141. See id.
142. See Karen Kane, Communicating by Proxy is No Longer Enough, DIRS. & BDS., Second
Quarter 2010, at 28.
143. See id.
144. See Jay W. Lorsch, Expectations Have Changed, DIRS. & BDS., Second Quarter 2010, at 18.
145. See Kane, supra note 142, at 28.
146. See Lorsch, supra note 144, at 18.
147. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 15 (noting the number of actors who initiate engagement
at corporations).
148. See Alexander V. Laskin, Investor Relations Practices at Fortune 500 Companies: An Exploratory Study, in THE IMPACT OF PR IN CREATING A MORE ETHICAL WORLD: WHY CAN’T WE ALL
GET ALONG? 241, 246–247 (2005), available at http://www.academia.edu/870724/Investor_
Relations_Practices_at_Fortune_500_Companies_An_Exploratory_Study.
149. See SOC’Y OF CORPORATE SEC’YS & GOVERNANCE PROF’LS, COMPENSATION SURVEY
REPORT 25 (2009); SOC’Y OF CORPORATE SEC’YS & GOVERNANCE PROF’LS, RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE CORPORATE SECRETARY’S OFFICE 8, 12–13 (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
CORPORATE SECRETARY’S OFFICE].
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retaries play a critical role in corporate-shareholder engagement, managing shareholder communications and acting as a liaison between the
board and shareholders.150 Finally, senior officers, particularly the CEO,
are responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the corporation,151 and thus
they may be better positioned to both address and respond to shareholder concerns.152 Arguably, all of these actors are better-informed than the
board, and hence they should be responsible for any engagement with
shareholders. By contrast, directors may have very little firsthand
knowledge of everyday corporate affairs, making them less-equipped to
effectively interact with shareholders.153
This relative informational disadvantage may mean that requiring
directors to interact with shareholders could have negative repercussions.
If directors must respond to queries about which they have no
knowledge, their lack of knowledge could fuel shareholder discontent by
fostering an image that directors are ill-informed regarding critical corporate governance matters.
These concerns may support the need to be cautious with respect to
board-shareholder engagement, as well as the need for engagement to
occur at other levels. Any engagement should occur after careful consideration and assessment of the issues to be discussed. Engagement also
should only occur when directors are fully informed regarding such issues. Finally, directors and management should distinguish between
those issues that are most appropriate for directors to address and those
that are best addressed by other actors.
Directors, however, should not be excused from the conversation altogether, particularly because the informational disadvantage that may
normally be present with respect to directors may not exist in the context
of the kinds of issues around which shareholders are most likely to want
engagement. To be sure, not every issue is appropriate for board-level
engagement. Yet, many of the issues about which shareholders are most
interested are precisely those that are most appropriate for the board to
discuss. A Spencer Stuart study revealed that shareholders are most interested in discussing compensation issues and topics related to board
composition and structure such as majority voting, board-chair independence, potential directors, and classified boards.154 Consistent with
this interest, corporate governance experts almost universally agree that
appropriate topics for board-shareholder communications include issues

150. See RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CORPORATE SECRETARY’S OFFICE, supra note 149.
151. Corporate Laws Comm., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 66
BUS. LAW. 975, 985 (2011) [hereinafter Corporate Director’s Guidebook].
152. See Lorsch, supra note 144, at 18; see also Norman R. Augustine, Malice in Wonderland,
BOARDROOM BRIEFING, Fall 2005, at 8, 8.
153. See Lorsch, supra note 144, at 18.
154. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 40, at 31; see also SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER
STUART BOARD INDEX 27 (2009), available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/
SSBI2009.pdf.
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such as executive compensation and board compensation and structure.155
Indeed, reforms have made boards—as distinct from any other corporate
actor—increasingly responsible for such issues.156 This suggests that issues of most concern to shareholders are those issues that fall within the
purview of the board’s responsibility, making directors uniquely qualified
to engage with shareholders on such issues. As a result, governance experts have noted that a “communications approach that relies exclusively
on management is increasingly disfavored.”157
5.

Objections Based on Increasing Shareholder Power

Some may object to increased board-shareholder engagement because it expands shareholders’ role, and hence power over corporate affairs. Such an objection would be similar to the general objections being
made concerning the broader effort to increase shareholder power.158 At
its core, opponents of engagement contend that increased shareholder
power undermines the efficiency of the board-centric model of the corporate form, while increasing the likelihood that shareholders with special interests will advance their personal agenda at the expense of the
long-term interests of the corporation and the broader shareholder
class.159 This objection cannot be used to undermine the validity of a
proposal for increased board-shareholder communication. First, regardless of the merits of such an objection, the fact that shareholders have
gained increased power within the corporation makes it largely academic
at this point. Second, to the extent that increased board-shareholder engagement can be used to alleviate some of the negative repercussions of
increased shareholder power, opponents of that increase should support
such engagement. Shareholders’ increased power gives them the ability
to act in ways that may have significant and negative repercussions for
the corporation and the board.160 Effective communication with share155. See FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS, supra note 78, at 14; Ira M. Millstein et al., Rethinking Board
and Shareholder Engagement in 2008 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.
aspx?pub=6382 (noting that boards “are well-advised to be open to shareholder communications on
topics that bear on board quality and attention to shareholder value”).
156. See supra Part II.
157. See ALAN L. BELLER ET AL., CLEARY GOTTLIEB, BOARD FOCUS 2010: ISSUES AND
DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2010), available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/c4421659-91ea-4b7e-a660-3cb0
a0faffd3/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fbb0e902-6619-4557-a5d5-3dc38f3125c5/CGSH%20Alert%20%20Board%20Focus%202010.pdf.
158. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 39–42; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 624 (2006) [hereinafter Shareholder Voting Rights]; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 15, at 666–67; Director Primacy, supra note 15,
at 1746.
159. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 39–42.
160. For example, shareholders can use their say on pay power to reject executive pay packages,
which many corporations seek to avoid. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 5. Shareholders also can use
proxy access to nominate and ultimately elect directors to the board who may have goals and interests
at-odds with existing board and management, while the changes with regard to classified boards means
that shareholders may be able to unseat an entire board in one election cycle. See supra Part I.A.
Shareholders also can withhold their votes against directors, and in a governance world in which cor-
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holders has the potential to address this phenomenon. Thus, boardshareholder communication is vital precisely because shareholders have
increased power.
C.

Concluding Assessment

This Part demonstrates that while there are potential costs associated with board-shareholder engagement, they may have been overstated.
Moreover, those costs must be balanced against the potential benefits of
such engagement, which are significant. While it is certainly no panacea,
current evidence strongly suggests that board-shareholder engagement
can be a powerful antidote for the potential ills that can occur when
shareholders are frustrated by the lack of effective communication with
corporate boards.161 Hence, such engagement should be a priority for all
corporations and their boards.
III. CRAFTING SOLUTIONS FOR ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT
If board-shareholder engagement should be prioritized, what should
such engagement look like? This Part responds to this query in three
parts. First, this Part argues that such engagement must move beyond
traditional channels of communication. After assessing the potential alternatives, however, this Part argues that the decision regarding which
alternative to adopt is best left to the discretion of the board. Third, this
Part maintains that we should at least consider proposals that would
more properly incentivize those corporations that fail to enhance their
engagement efforts.
A.

The Existing Communication Regime and Its Shortcomings

This Section demonstrates that the existing channels of communication are inadequate for promoting constructive dialogue, and hence argues that alternative channels must be adopted. Traditionally, the annual meeting, proxy statement, and shareholder proposal process
represented the primary, if not exclusive, methods of communication between shareholders and the corporation/board.162 While each of these
methods is important, none of them is particularly conducive to constructive dialogue between boards and shareholders.163 Although technology
has enhanced the ability of boards and shareholders to communicate,

porations have increasingly embraced majority voting, such withholding power can lead to directors
losing their seat on the board. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 89–90.
161. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A.
162. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 63–65 (discussing the shareholder meetings and proposal process); David Silverman, Open Your Mindset to the Bigger Picture, DIRS. & BDS.,
First Quarter 2011, at 33.
163. See infra Part III.A.1–3.
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such technological advances do not appear to overcome the shortcomings of the current communication apparatus.164
1.

The Annual Meeting

Although the annual meeting is the primary, if not sole, setting in
which shareholders have the opportunity to interact with directors faceto-face,165 it is not an ideal setting for constructive dialogue for a host of
reasons. First, effective engagement with concerned shareholders may
not be feasible because most shareholders in public corporations are dispersed and hence do not attend the annual meeting in person; instead
they attend and vote by proxy.166 As a result, it is not clear that engagement at the annual meeting would reach the appropriate audience.167
Second, the effectiveness of any engagement effort is undermined by the
fact that most shareholders vote by proxy, and thus most shareholders
will already have cast their vote prior to the annual meeting date.168
Third, the fact that most issues are resolved prior to the annual meeting,
and that most shareholders do not attend the annual meeting, increases
the likelihood that those who attend the annual meeting may do so for
symbolic reasons related to expressing their discontent, rather than to
promote meaningful dialogue.169 Fourth, the very fact that the annual
meeting requires shareholders to vote increases the likelihood that such
meetings will be contentious. In other words, the high stakes nature of
some director elections and other matters to be voted on during the annual meeting may create a tense and contentious atmosphere that is not
conducive to meaningful communications. Finally, because there may be
a number of important matters on the annual meeting agenda, it may be
difficult for shareholders and the board to focus meaningfully on other
business during the annual meeting.170 Thus, the annual meeting is not an
ideal environment for constructive discussion between directors and
shareholders.
2.

Proxy Statements and Disclosure Documents

Clearly the proxy statement and other relevant disclosure documents serve as one of the first lines of communication between share-

164. See infra Part III.A.4.
165. See Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45–46 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that the
shareholder meeting represents a forum for deliberation and confrontation); Elizabeth Boros, Virtual
Shareholder Meetings: Who Decides How Companies Make Decisions?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 265, 268
(2004).
166. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 127.
167. See Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26.
168. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 127–28.
169. See Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26.
170. See Shaw, supra note 124, at 38 (revealing that most communications with shareholders at
the annual meeting occurs through speeches and reports).
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holders and directors.171 Because most shareholders do not attend the
annual meeting in person, the corporate proxy statement has taken the
place of the annual meeting as the primary platform through which public corporations communicate with their shareholders.172 Such communication through disclosure documents is valuable precisely because it is
written and allows for more nuanced and thoughtful explanations of
board positions.173 As a result, such communication may reduce shareholder concerns and anxiety that could lead to increased activism. Importantly, shareholders’ enhanced power has caused corporations and
boards to place renewed emphasis on ensuring that their disclosure documents are more informative and understandable.174
Disclosure, however, cannot be the only mode of communication,
particularly because it is not a two-way dialogue. Disclosure does not allow shareholders to respond to directors or otherwise provide their insights and perspectives on corporate policies in a way that may allow
boards to take such matters into account. Most experts agree that disclosure is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of board-shareholder
engagement.175 Instead, communication through disclosure documents
serves as a critical complement to more constructive board-shareholder
dialogue.
3.

The Shareholder Proposal Process

The shareholder proposal process plays a critical role in the current
communication environment. By introducing proposals on particular
topics, shareholders signal to the corporation the issues about which
shareholders are concerned, while their vote reflects the strength of
shareholder support for such issues.176 Most importantly, shareholder
proposals often serve as an important starting point in a dialogue between corporations and shareholders around pivotal issues.177 From this
perspective, the proposal process has played an important role in shareholder engagement.
Like the proxy statement and disclosure documents more generally,
the proposal process may be an important component of boardshareholder engagement, but it is not sufficient on its own. To be sure,
the proposal process is critical. Often the mere submission of a shareholder proposal prompts more detailed and meaningful dialogue be-

171. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2 (noting that “shareholder communications start with
the company’s public filings”).
172. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 63.
173. See BELLER ET AL., supra note 157, at 82 (noting that corporations can use disclosure related
to compensation to communicate the company’s story “succinctly and in plain English”).
174. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
175. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2.
176. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 63–65.
177. See id.
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tween shareholders and the corporation.178 It has important limitations,
however. First, the proposal process does not allow for significant interaction between the board and shareholders. Instead, the formal proposal
process involves shareholders submitting a proposal and the board offering its response.179 Such a process is a very limited form of two-way dialogue. Second, the proposal process is a very blunt engagement vehicle
because when shareholders submit proposals they are limited to five
hundred words, which does not allow for shareholders to pinpoint nuances in the concerns they raise through the proposal process and otherwise have more detailed explanations regarding their concerns.180 In this
regard, the proposal process may be an important starting point for engagement, but cannot be the sole mechanism for engagement.
4.

Internet-Based Communications

Outside of the annual meeting and disclosure documents, technology has greatly enhanced a corporation’s ability to communicate with
shareholders. Every major corporation has a website that conveys critical information to shareholders.181 Many corporations also have blogs
and Twitter accounts.182 Corporations use such devices to facilitate ongoing communication with their shareholders.
Corporations also can participate in electronic shareholder forums.
In 2008, the SEC passed rules aimed at facilitating the use of electronic
shareholder forums.183 Such forums can take many forms from websites
to blogs, but are essentially platforms that allow shareholders and corporations to communicate through the Internet.184 The SEC’s 2008 rules
were designed to facilitate the use of electronic shareholder forums by
removing some of the hurdles associated with such use.185 The SEC believed that electronic shareholder forums could provide a cost-effective
means of more routine communications among shareholders and between shareholders and the corporation.186
Unfortunately, these technologies have been limited in their use and
utility. First, it does not appear that corporations have used electronic
shareholder forums in any significant manner.187 Second, it appears that

178. See id.
179. See Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-8(m) (2007).
180. See id. § 240.14a-8(d).
181. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 121.
182. See id.
183. See Electronic Shareholder Forums, Exchange Act Release No. 57,172, Investment Company
Act Release No. 28,124, 73 Fed. Reg. 4450 (Jan. 25, 2008).
184. See id. at 4451, 4457.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 4451, 4455.
187. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Online Shareholder Forums Slow to Catch On, COMPLIANCE
WEEK (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?returl=/online-shareholderforums-slow-to-catch-
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devices such as blogs and Twitter accounts have been used primarily as
bulletin boards or announcement platforms,188 and thus do little to promote two-way dialogue between shareholders and the corporation. Such
a use is understandable given the public nature of such vehicles. Regardless, such use reveals that corporate communication through the Internet
may do little to enhance thoughtful discourse between corporations and
their shareholders.
5.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

Technology has expanded the extent to which shareholders and
corporations can interact during the annual meeting. Most corporations
not only broadcast their annual meetings through the web, but also allow
shareholders to participate remotely.189 Some corporations even host
remote-only or virtual shareholder meetings, pursuant to which all
shareholders participate in the meeting remotely.190 During such meetings, corporations provide a mechanism for shareholders to submit questions before or during the annual meeting.191 Modern technology has increased the potential for shareholder engagement during the annual
meeting.
This remote interaction, however, does not appear to support constructive dialogue between directors and shareholders. In fact, shareholders have been extremely resistant to proposals for electronic-only
shareholder meetings.192 Shareholder advocates argue that remote meetings run counter to the primary benefits of face-to face meetings: the
ability to directly interact with the board and management.193 Shareholders also express concern that remote interactions would enable the board
and management to ignore difficult issues.194 Indeed, corporations that
host remote meetings do emphasize the fact that they could not guarantee that they would address all shareholder questions during the meeting.195 This fed shareholder fears that management would ignore shareholder concerns or otherwise only respond to favorable inquiries.196
Shareholder concerns regarding remote-only meetings have led to very

on/article/185986/&pagetypeid=28&articleid=185986&accesslevel=2&expireddays=0&accessAndPrice
=0.
188. See Julie Jones & Cynthia McMakin, Is Your Company Tweeting Towards Trouble?—Twitter
and Securities Law Compliance, 23 INSIGHTS 19, 20 (2009) (noting that companies primarily use tweeting for marketing, advertising, and disseminating information).
189. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
1367, 1368 (2010) [hereinafter VSM].
190. See id. at 1388.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1392–93, 1396.
193. See Boros, supra note 165, at 268; see also VSM, supra note 189, at 1391.
194. See VSM, supra note 189, at 1392.
195. See id. at 1388.
196. See id. at 1392.
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few corporations relying on such meetings.197 Shareholders do not view
such meetings as a substitute for genuine interaction with the board.
6.

Informal Interactions

Board-shareholder engagement can occur informally, such as
through brief phone calls, email exchanges, or even short meetings.
Studies indicate that corporations do informally interact with their
shareholders. Such interactions may be more productive because they
allow shareholders and corporate officials to speak outside of the spot198
Such interactions also can occur
light, and in a more casual manner.
more frequently because they can occur without the trappings of, including the preparation related to, a formal meeting. These informal interactions have drawbacks, however, and are insufficient on their own to ensure meaningful board-shareholder dialogue. There is the possibility that
their more casual nature may increase the likelihood that directors and
others who engage in such interactions do not do so with the appropriate
199
planning and care necessary for all board-shareholder engagement.
Moreover, it is likely that corporate officials cannot delve into more serious governance issues during informal exchanges because of their relative brevity and casualness. From this perspective, it is likely that informal interactions can serve as a supplement to more formal
engagements—providing an important starting point, laying important
groundwork, or enabling brief follow-ups—but cannot supplant those
200
engagements. Perhaps most critically, it is less likely that such informal
interactions can occur at the board level simply because board members
are part-time, and thus may not have the time to engage in these more
201
routine and casual exchanges. Indeed, studies reveal that informal in202
In fact, even during the
teractions do not often occur with directors.
annual meeting, only a small portion of interactions occur via one-on-one
203
meetings between directors and shareholders. This suggests that such
information exchanges may be rare and limited in their ability to facilitate constructive dialogue. Importantly, this Article distinguishes between informal interactions and private meetings. Under this Article’s
view, such interactions involve brief, more casual, exchanges with shareholders. By contrast, private meetings are more structured and formal.
Such meetings not only may be productive because they occur behind
197. See id. at 1396.
198. See Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance, 61
S.C. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (2009) (emphasizing the importance of private negotiations); GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 112, at 9 (noting sentiment regarding the relative effectiveness of private meetings).
199. See supra notes 119–124 and accompanying text.
200. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 12 (noting that some sixty percent of engagement with
companies starts with a telephone call).
201. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 135, at 14.
202. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 15.
203. See SHAW, supra note 124, at 38.
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closed doors, but also are precisely the forms of engagement advocated
by this Article.
7.

Concluding Assessment

The various limitations to effective communication associated with
the current communication regime mean that a different approach may
be necessary for boards and shareholders to reap the benefits of constructive engagement. The next Section examines potential approaches
and the board’s role in determining their viability.
B.

New Avenues of Engagement

A variety of different alternatives have been proposed for enhancing meaningful discussion between directors and shareholders. This Section examines some of the most prevalent.
1.

The Fifth Analyst Call

In 2010, a group of institutional investors began requesting that several corporations host a “Fifth Analyst” call.204 A Fifth Analyst call refers to a dedicated teleconference with shareholders focused exclusively
on governance issues.205 Under the proposal, either the independent
board chair or the lead director would be required to participate in the
call, while board committee chairs also would be encouraged to participate.206 The agenda would be agreed upon in advance, but would revolve
around matters covered in the proxy statement.207 The call would occur
after publication of the proxy statement, but prior to the annual meeting.208 In April 2011, Occidental Petroleum Corporation became the
first—and to date the only—corporation to host such a call.209
The primary benefit of such calls is that they would enable boardshareholder communication outside of, and prior to, the annual meeting.
Thus, the hope is that such calls would allow directors and shareholders
to exchange their thoughts and insights regarding important governance

204. See ALEXIS KRAJESKI ET AL., REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE: FIFTH ANALYST CALL
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE PROXY STATEMENT (2010) [hereinafter REQUEST FOR
INVESTOR DIALOGUE], available at http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101201_Fifth
Analyst.pdf; David A. Katz, Investor Communication and “Fifth Analyst Call,” HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 15, 2011, 9:13 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corp
gov/2011/02/15/investor-communication-and-fifth-analyst-call/. Such calls would be in addition to the
quarterly analyst calls that corporations routinely host after they have released their quarterly financial results.
205. See Katz, supra note 204.
206. See id.
207. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 3.
208. See id. at 1.
209. See Shanny Basar, Occidental Petroleum Hosts ‘Fifth Analyst Call’, FIN. NEWS (April 7,
2011), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-04-07/occidental-fifth-call.
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matters.210 Because they predate the annual meeting and proxy voting,
such calls also are designed to allow the board to further explain their
positions to shareholders, or otherwise address any shareholder concerns
prior to the shareholder vote.211
Critics raise several concerns regarding the Fifth Analyst call.212
First, it is possible that such a call would be redundant because issues in
the proxy statement are covered extensively by the proxy statement.213
Of course, the fact that the proxy statement addresses an issue does not
necessarily mean that the issue has been addressed in a clear manner, or
otherwise in a manner that would alleviate shareholder concerns, particularly if corporations have not engaged their shareholders and hence
do not have a sufficient understanding of shareholder concerns. A second concern relates specifically to directors’ participation. Critics insist
that it would place an undue and unfair burden on directors to require
them to speak to the wide range of issues raised by the proxy statement,
particularly when such directors do not participate in drafting the proxy
statement.214 On the one hand, there does appear to be a wide range of
topics about which investors would like directors to address during the
Fifth Analyst call,215 which raises concerns about directors’ capacity to effectively engage.216 On the other hand, not only is there a growing expectation that directors be familiar with information in their company’s
proxy statement, but also directors can shape the agenda to include only
those items that are appropriate for board-level discussions.217 The potential breadth of the agenda is thus a concern, but there is a potential to
minimize that concern. Relatedly, critics argue that Fifth Analyst calls
will require directors to expend too much time and resources.218 While
such a concern can be minimized by curtailing some of the issues to be
discussed at the meeting, it also must be considered in light of the potential benefits to be gained.
There may be additional drawbacks to such calls that have not been
raised by critics. Like a virtual shareholder meeting, such calls do not allow face-to face interactions. As a result, it is not clear if they can actually facilitate direct interaction between directors and shareholders, partic-

210. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 1.
211. See id. at 3.
212. Critics also raise concerns regarding whether such calls would violate Regulation FD.
213. See Katz, supra note 204.
214. See id.
215. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 2–3.
216. See Katz, supra note 204.
217. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 3 (noting that the agenda would
be agreed upon prior to the meeting).
218. See Jeff Cossette, Debate Rages over Fifth Analyst Call, INSIDE INVESTOR RELATIONS (April
4, 2011), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/proxy-voting-annual-meetings/18141/debaterages-over-fifth-analyst-call/.
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ularly if a large group of shareholders participate in the call.219 There also
is a potential that such calls could become rote and formulaic, undermining their utility.220 A key criticism of traditional shareholders’ meetings
and quarterly analysts calls is that they have become too scripted, rendering them invaluable.221 From this perspective, there is a danger that once
a meeting becomes part of a corporation’s routine, it could become highly scripted, and thus not offer shareholders and directors any meaningful
opportunity to hold a constructive conversation.
2.

Shareholder Governance Meetings

A shareholder governance meeting refers to a meeting between the
board and shareholders outside of the annual meeting.222 Proposals with
respect to such meetings run the gamut. Some have suggested that investors meet with particular board committees.223 Others have proposed
that the corporation host an “investor day,” whereby board members invite shareholders to engage with them.224 Still others have proposed that
corporations meet routinely with their large investors.225 In fact, Pfizer
became the first company to announce its intention to meet with its largest shareholders on a more routine basis.226 Pfizer then held one meeting
with thirty of its largest investors; a handful of other companies followed
Pfizer’s lead and held such meetings as well.227
Like the Fifth Analyst call, such meetings have potential benefits
and drawbacks. Such meetings would enable directors to interact with
shareholders and potentially exchange perspective and insights regarding
critical corporate governance issues.228 Because the meetings would occur in person, there may be a greater potential for constructive dialogue.229 Still, these meetings raise concerns with respect to resources
and costs as well as the possibility that they would lose their utility by becoming mechanical and scripted.230

219. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 2. Meetings will be held by conference calls or conducted virtually. Thus, there is a potential that communication may be hampered,
particularly if large numbers of shareholders participate.
220. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 3; Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26.
221. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 3; Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26.
222. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 8–9.
223. See id. at 9.
224. See id. at 8–9.
225. See id. at 9.
226. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 124.
227. Id.
228. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 1.
229. See Boros, supra note 165, at 260 (pinpointing the benefits of face-to-face meetings).
230. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 3; Hagberg, supra note 126, at 6.
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Structural Changes

Some have suggested facilitating board-shareholder communication
by making structural changes to the board itself.231 Such changes include
the creation of a new board committee responsible for shareholder relations as well as creation of an advisory committee comprised of shareholders and other interested parties whose task would be to provide insight to the board with respect to important governance issues.232
One benefit of these kinds of structural changes is that they may
signal to shareholders that the corporation places a high priority on
shareholder engagement.233 Similar to the creation of other committees,
such changes may enhance directors’ ability to oversee the corporation’s
engagement efforts, giving directors a greater ability to monitor and coordinate with other actors responsible for shareholder engagement.234
Some may view the addition of yet another board committee as unnecessary. Moreover, these structural changes do not appear to serve as
a substitute for other mechanisms. Instead, they may best be viewed as a
coordinating vehicle for these other mechanisms.
4.

Board Discretion

In addition to their costs and benefits, each of these mechanisms
raises a host of issues that must be resolved. For example, should shareholder engagements be public or private, or some combination thereof?
There are at least two benefits of a private meeting; both shareholders
and directors may be able to speak more candidly, and such a meeting
may be more conducive to constructive dialogue.235 Indeed, the more
people involved, the less likely that constructive dialogue can occur.236
Yet private meetings pose their own set of challenges. There is a greater
risk of violating Regulation FD.237 Private meetings also raise concerns
regarding transparency. Indeed, the Fifth Analyst call held by Occidental was private and was sharply criticized on the basis of its lack of
transparency.238 Second, if the meeting is private, who should be allowed
to participate in such meetings or calls? Potential attendees include both
231. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 9.
232. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that UnitedHealth group had established an
advisory committee to allow shareholders to suggest new directors).
233. See Corporate Director’s Guidebook, supra note 151, at 1012–13 (explaining the importance
of committees to board governance).
234. See id. at 1016–22 (explaining the coordination and monitoring function of audit committees).
235. See Yockey, supra note 198, at 171–72 (emphasizing the importance of private negotiations);
see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 9 (noting sentiment regarding the relative effectiveness of private meetings).
236. See Yockey, supra note 198, at 171–72; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 9.
237. See Yockey, supra note 198, at 210.
238. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that the Occidental call would have been improved
through more transparency).

FAIRFAX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3]

4/23/2013 1:43 PM

ENGAGEMENT

853

institutional and retail investors as well as proxy advisors and other market participants that influence shareholder voting. A limitation geared at
institutional investors or large investors increases the likelihood that participants would have a significant and long-term interest in the corporation, but some corporations have large retail investor bases that should
not be ignored.239 Muddling the picture still further, directors must consider whether and to what extent boards should include representatives
from proxy advisory firms in the meeting.240 Third, how frequently
should such meetings occur? Fourth, which member or members of the
board should participate? These and other issues must be properly resolved to ensure that any engagement is effective, which suggests that directors should be involved in the decision regarding the appropriate form
of engagement.
Ultimately, there is no one size fits all model of engagement because they all involve trade-offs that the corporation should carefully
consider. The board is likely in the best position to balance those
tradeoffs.
C.

Considering a Mandate

Many boards appear reluctant to move beyond the status quo with
regard to shareholder engagement.241 While some of the reluctance is
understandable, it is also possible that boards are allowing a general
aversion to engagement to outweigh a proper assessment of the costs and
benefits of such engagement. Thus, surveyed directors and investors
have expressed concern that some directors and managers have a mindset against engagement that impedes their ability to have constructive
discussions about the topic.242 In a recent study of engagement, while only a small number of respondents would “go so far as to accuse [boards
and managers] of being generally unwilling to engage,” nearly thirty percent of respondents cited “philosophical considerations,” such as entrenched management, as an obstacle to engagement.243 While some respondents expressed satisfaction with their access to directors, the survey
highlighted the fact that a number expressed frustration with such access,
while noting a “widespread perception” that management often acted as
239. Realistically, however, it may be difficult to host an efficient meeting if the entire retail investor base is included in the discussions. And corporations may legitimately contend that, in light of
such difficulties, retail investors should be excluded from these special governance meetings and thus
limited to raising concerns at the annual meeting. A potential middle ground could be to enable the
board to limit participants to a certain number of institutional investors, while either allowing retail
investors to listen to the meeting or distributing to such investors a transcript of the meeting.
240. Although some corporations and investors note that one of the benefits of boardshareholder communication may be that it enables directors and shareholders to talk directly to one
another, without going through an intermediary. Hence, the proposal for a Fifth Analyst call specifically excludes proxy advisors. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 3.
241. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 3.
242. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 6.
243. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 21.
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a “gatekeeper,” whose mission was to keep shareholders away from directors.244 As a result, it is entirely possible that some directors simply
will not enhance their engagement efforts even when there may be clear
benefits to such engagement, and even when the failure to engage causes
the corporation and its shareholders to incur unnecessary costs.245
In light of this possibility, to the extent that constructive communication between directors and shareholders is vital, we may need to consider measures beyond mere encouragement. Such measures can take a
variety of different forms, and could stem from a variety of different
sources.
On one end of the spectrum are proposals that would give shareholders the ability to require engagement. For example, one possibility
is that corporations could be required to host a special governance meeting when a specified number of shareholders request such a meeting. At
least one institutional investor has advanced such a proposal.246 To be
sure, determining an optimal ownership threshold for shareholders who
make such a request would prove challenging. The optimal level is one
that is not preclusive, but ensures that the ability to call a special governance meeting is utilized only by shareholders with significant and long
term-interests in the corporation.247 In the context of shareholder proposals related to special meetings, while corporations appear to prefer a
higher threshold such as twenty-five percent or more, shareholders have
advocated lower thresholds, with ten percent being the threshold generating the strongest amount of shareholder support.248 Despite disagreement with respect to the threshold, in the special meeting context, corporations have recognized the importance of hosting a meeting once a
significant number of shareholders indicate their desire to call the meeting.249 Thus, there is some recognition that requiring a meeting with
shareholders is appropriate once a sufficient number of shareholders express their desire for such a meeting.

244. See id.
245. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that “the current paradigm of board-shareholder
engagement fails both boards and shareholders”).
246. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 2.
247. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29, 384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668
(Sept. 16, 2010) (discussing the purpose of ownership thresholds, and noting one experts comment that
“only those long-term shareholders who are seriously concerned about the governance of portfolio
companies will have a seat at the table”).
248. See Richard Sandler & Elizabeth Weinstein, Spotlight on Shareholder Proposals: Special
Meetings, DAVIS POLK (July 30, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/corporate
governance/blog.aspx?entry=201; see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2012 PROXY SEASON
REVIEW 4-6 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 PROXY SEASON REVIEW], available at http://www.sullcrom.com/
files/Publication/fdd28332-7b79-4d37-9ada-89da9bc111a9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d54685
8a-ee4a-43af-b379-170d4995e41c/2012_Proxy_Season_Review-7-20-2012.pdf.
249. 2012 PROXY SEASON REVIEW, supra note 248 (noting proposals by Vanguard and T. Rowe
Price).
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This proposal has clear drawbacks along with potential benefits.
With respect to drawbacks, a proposal that augments shareholder power
in this area could be viewed as objectionable on its face because it further shifts the balance of power away from boards. It is possible, however, that such a proposal could be deemed appropriate because it gives
shareholders the ability to influence the decision regarding what constitutes an optimal level and mix of engagement. In addition to concerns
about resources and inappropriate use by shareholders seeking to advance their own agenda, implementation of such a proposal involves several resource and other logistical hurdles (particularly resolution of the
ownership trigger) that could prove insurmountable. By contrast, one
important benefit of such a proposal is that it would not require corporations to hold a meeting every year.250 Instead, it enables shareholders to
opt into a meeting when other forms of communication have not been
deemed sufficient.251 This therefore could be viewed as a soft mandate,
as well as one that is consistent with private ordering. Moreover, it is
possible that such a proposal’s primary benefit would be indirect. In
other words, the shareholder power to call a special governance meeting
may be sufficient to induce directors to proactively reach out to, and engage with, shareholders to avoid the necessity of such a meeting. From
this perspective, one of the primary benefits would be to alter director
behavior with respect to engagement, particularly with regard to those
directors who may be opposed to such engagement based on rigid attitudes against dialogue with shareholders.
On the other end of the spectrum are proposals related to the SEC.
For example, the SEC could require disclosure on whether and to what
extent corporations engaged in outreach beyond traditional channels.252
The SEC has adopted disclosure requirements in an effort to influence
corporate conduct,253 and has experienced some success.254 Such a disclosure rule may be sufficient to incentivize companies to enhance their engagement. There are costs and unintended consequences associated with
regulation by disclosure.255 This disclosure approach, however, may be
the most practical and desirable first step when considering how best the
250. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 2. The proposal enables shareholders to call a special governance meeting whenever they deem appropriate—and they meeting the threshold requirements—and
thus such meetings are not required to occur annually.
251. See id. Shareholders presumably would call such meetings at their discretion, and likely once
other methods of communication have fallen short of resolving the issues or issues of concern.
252. Such a rule could be crafted similar to the SEC’s recent rule related to disclosure on board
diversity, that requires corporations to disclose “whether, and if so, how” the nominating committee
considers board diversity. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old
Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 866–67 (2011) [hereinafter Board Diversity Revisited]. The rule can be
found at Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2012).
253. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1270 (1999).
254. See Board Diversity Revisited, supra note 252, at 873–74.
255. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473 (2007).
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SEC can better ensure that corporations are willing to embrace boardshareholder engagement because it falls short of mandating a corporate
governance change, and thus may be deemed a more moderate reform.
There may be a wide range of objections to each of these proposals,
or any other that does more than seek to encourage board-shareholder
engagement. Most notably, some may insist that board-shareholder engagement will reach optimal levels without the need for the imposition of
mandates. While studies with respect to increased levels of engagement
may support this insistence,256 other indicators suggest that some corporations may prove unwilling to engage despite its benefits.257 To the extent
this is a valid suggestion, proposals that aim to better incentivize boardshareholder engagement should at least be discussed. Indeed, given their
increased ability to influence board elections and corporate policy, the
failure to respond to shareholder frustrations in this area could have repercussions in other areas.
CONCLUSION
Shareholders’ increased influence over corporate affairs has made
board-shareholder engagement a corporate governance priority. Even
once reluctant and resistant corporate directors and officers are beginning to realize the importance of outreach efforts involving directors and
shareholders.
This Article confirms the importance of boardshareholder engagement. Indeed, this Article argues that both the costs
and the risks of board-shareholder engagement may have been vastly
overstated, and that the benefits to be gained may be well worth the
costs. This Article also identifies the shortcomings of the existing communication channels, and therefore argues for the adoption of alternative
models of communication.
This Article further argues for consideration of proposals that
would do more than merely confirm or encourage the benefits of boardshareholder engagement. Indeed, evidence suggests that at least some
boards appear to be extremely reluctant to meaningfully enhance their
interactions with shareholders, particularly with regard to engagement
beyond traditional settings. This reluctance is unfortunate because it
means that directors, and by extension the corporation, are missing out
on a critical opportunity to better address shareholder concerns, better
educate the shareholder base, better understand future issues, better respond to shareholder activism, and ultimately avoid contentious shareholder battles that often stem from lack of communication or miscommunication. As a result, this Article contends that we should consider
reforms that would require or at least better incentivize boards to engage
with shareholders. While such an action may seem costly and even risky
256.
257.

See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 12.
See supra notes 244–248 and accompanying text.
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at first glance, in the long run it may be riskier to allow some corporations to opt out of engagement and the corresponding benefits that flow
from it.
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